Introduction
Essentially, efficiency-wage models are bas, ed on the proposition that the structure of compensation affects the productivity of workers. The presumption is that employee work effort, or efficiency, is a positive function of the wage rate: the higher the wage the finn pays, the harder its employees work.
Although there are a number of different microeconomic foundations for these models (Akerlof, 1984; Yellen, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Stiglitz, 1987) , the underlying assumption is the existenc, e of a positive wageproductivity nexus. Since sporting competitions offer a reliable pool of data to test certain economic hypotheses (in contrast to the paucity of accurate measures both of employee effort and company incentive structures), it is not surprising that interest in the relationship between compensation structures and performance has ẽncouraged res, earch in tournament models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Carmichael, 1983; Green and Stokey, 1983; Malcomson, 1984~ Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1984; O'Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 1984; Rosen, 1986; McLaughlin, 1988) . Intuitively, given both the level and distribution of prize money, one might expect tournament rewards to offer individuals an incentive to provide improved levels of performance.
To test whether tournaments do in fact encourage appropriate effort responses, recent research by Ehrenberg and Bognanno ( 1990 a and b) The level of prize money varied considerably across tournaments. Howevẽr, the procedure for allocating total prize money, based on the rank order of the final 6? players at the en_d of each tournament, did not change during the Tour. The essenttal aspects of thts procedure, illustrated in Table II , are similar to the st~cture _for distributing prize mo~ey in the United States and European Tours surveyed tn prev1ous research. Australasian tournaments, therefore, also exhibit the critical featurẽ of the structure of financial rewards, namely, that there is a much higher marginal return for improving performance in the final round by one rank to those close to the tournament leader than to those close to the bottom. In the Palm Meadows Cup, for example, the marginal return for coming first rather than second was A$86,000 and for coming second rather than third was A$46,800. Compare this with the difference of A$240 for coming fifty-ninth rather than ' last. Given information on total prizẽ money and the fixed allocation procedure, it is possible to examine the relationship between performanoe and both the Iẽvẽl of prize money and marginal returns to effort in the final round. All golf tournaments operate a complex system of exemptions relating to eligibility. For Australasian Tours, automatic ẽntry (or exemption) is granted to the leading 60 players from the previous year's Tour, the J, eading five or ten players from other international tours in the previous year, winners of major tournaments in Australia or New Zealand., and Australian and New Zealand winners of major overseas tournaments. Those not granted exemption must qualify by their performance in a pre-qualifying round held prior to a ~p:cific tournament. Given that tournaments will include exẽmpt and non-exempt players, tt ts possible that the relationship between financial incentive and perfo1 1nance will be different for the two groups.
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To allow for this, the model is estimated for both groups.
One view is that 'better players are, in fact, more responsive to fmancial incentives' BognaJUlo, 1990a: 1322) . On the other hand, many of the better exempt players on the Australasian Tour_ are successful in northern hemisphere tournaments where fmancial rewards are much greater.
It m1ght be assumed, therefore, that the incentive to improve performance on the less lucrative Here, for the first time, the appropriate form will be ẽxplicitly tested. For this purpose, the Box-Cox (1964) general transformation function will be used and, hence, the specification given in the Appendix will be estimated.
The results and implications
The summary statistics for each variable under consideration are reported in Table III. Estimates of the non-linear model specified in the appendix and its restricted versions (the linear and log-linear models) for the entire sample (n = 820), the exempt players (n = 364) and the non-exẽmpt players (n = 456) are reported in Table IV. It can be sẽen from the nine equations presẽnted that the conclusions that can be drawn from the thrẽe different samples used are the samẽ and, therefore, the qualitative implications of different equations are identical. This robustness is also confirmed by the restrictions on the ~unctional form. Although, using appropriate likelihood ratio tests, the estimated equations obtained conclusively show that the linear model (A. = 1) is not appropriate, it still yields qualitative results which are consistent with the non-restricted specification and the morẽ appropriate log-linear specification.
The 4 final-round score equation· tests \\'hether the financial incentive of greater marginal returns fron1 in1proving one ·s ranking in the last round leads to a lo\\·er final-round score. This is discussed in Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a , 1318 -1321 and 1990 . To estimate ho\v total prize money influences performance in the first two rounds of a tournament, Bognanno ( I990a, 1315-1318) also include a ·score after second-round equation· for the 1984 United States tournaments. The results show that prize money does not influence performance in the early stages of a tournament. The same approach was actually adopted for the Australasian Tour and the results are not statistically significant and are not reported. The Incentive Effects of Tournaments
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All estimated coefficients, except P~ (namely, the course length), are statistically significant at the conventional test levels with correct signs. This clearly suggests that all the variables but one listed in Table IV play a statistically significant role in explaining the final score (FS ). Given the major thrust of the present study, it is important to note that the prize mo~ey coefficient, p, has the correct sign (negative) and is highly significant i~ all n~ne estimated equations. This patently confirms that total prize money does offer an tncenttve to improve the level of performance even though financial incentives, on the whole, are appreciably less than P· GA tournam· ents in the United States and Europe. Some results deserve additional comment. The coeffici· ent a:h for the Australian ' Open, is significant but has a positive sign. This runs counter to Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a : 1314 and 1990b . Their results show that scores are lower for major tournaments in the United States and Europe which offer a range of financial inducements in excess of total prize money. Although "rewards" for the Australian Open are similarly attractive, higher scores are exp. lained by the course being prepared deliberately as a much tougher test for golfers than other tournaments on the Australasian Tour.
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The coefficient P 4 , for the length of a course, suggests it has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the tournam· ent score. Again, the Ehrenberg-Bognanno results ( 1990a : 1314 and 1990b In contrast to recent interest in tournament productivity is influenced by the size of the reasons, particularly in situations where the workers and firms exists, it may prove pro market rate. One explanation for this is that turnover and a consequent saving in hiring cu8
will attract a higher quality labour force. Apotential earnings elsewhere) generate an discharge. In this case, the fiint benefits monitoring costs. In addition, it has been arJUid employer encourages a reciprocal "gift" of i Smith, 1991 : 423). The present study confinM tournament-type incentive structures as one
Conclusion
Central to the theory of tournaments is the h and the distribution of this prize money, fi improved levels of perfonnance. Applied implies that increases in prize money will I Australasian Tour of 1991 clearly confirms thi IV play a significant role in explaining the highly significant and has the correct sign.
The reliable pool of data from sporting com hypotheses (see Goff and Tollison, 1990) . Of extent to which it supports the basic proposi that the structure of compensation affects -r,..., Tour encourages desired effort responses; positive wage-productivity nexus.
